According to security researchers with IOActive and Quarkslab, the popular confidential messaging app called Confide is riddled with security vulnerabilities.
Researchers found that this application could allow attackers to leak session information, enumerate users, and access details like emails and phone numbers.
In a recent report, IoActive states the apps notification system did not require a valid SSL server certification to communicate, ultimately leaking session information to MiTM attacks. Additionally, the app allowed unencrypted messages to be delivered without ever altering the user.
IOActive researchers found that the software was uploading file attachments before the user sent the intended message and that it allowed attackers to send malformed messages that could crash, slow, or otherwise disrupt the app.
Furthermore, the app did not use authenticated encryption, meaning confide was able to later messages in-transit. According to Bédrune, the app did not use a cryptographic integrity mechanism and the cryptographic protocol did not involve authentication. When notified of a new message, the client would request a list of unread threats from the server but had no way of verifying the origin of the message or the sender’s public keys.
Even worse, the app did not employ a mechanism to prevent against brute force attacks on user account passwords. Not surprisingly. the apps' website was also found to be plagued with vulnerabilities. Researchers discovered an arbitrary URL redirection that could facilitate social engineering attacks against its users. In addition, the website was observed reflecting incorrectly entered passwords back to the browser.
Confide has since updated its mobile and desktop applications to address some of the vulnerabilities. Confide promotes the fact they employ ‘military grade end to end encryption’, but the evidence shows there is a lot of work that needs to be done before this organization can promote themselves as a ‘confidential messenger application’.